Quantifying the Impact of Political Frictions on Public Policy by Grechyna, Daryna
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Quantifying the Impact of Political





MPRA Paper No. 65266, posted 26. June 2015 10:32 UTC





This paper evaluates the impact of political frictions on scal policy in a sample
of developed countries. We use a model of scal policy that features a lack of
commitment by the government, political turnover, and another political friction
which can be interpreted either as political polarization or as public rent-seeking.
Political turnover increases public debt levels, while political polarization or public
rent-seeking lead to higher public spending. We nd that political frictions account
for 67% of variation in government debt, 36% of variation in government spending,
and 24% of variation in taxes in twenty two developed countries.
Keywords: scal policy; political turnover; political polarization; public rent-seeking.
JEL Classication Numbers: E61, E62, H21, H63.
Department of Economics, Middlesex University London, Business School, Hendon Campus, The
Burroughs, London NW4 4BT, UK. Tel.: +44 (0)2084115000. E-mail: dgrechna@gmail.com.
1
1 Introduction
It has been recognized that scal policy is not necessarily set by benevolent government,
and thus might not be e¢ cient. Even in Western Europe and North America, considered
to be the most developed regions in the world, many countries su¤er from imperfections
in political institutions resulting, among other things, in prohibitively high public debt
levels. A large number of theoretical studies have shown that political frictions are the
main cause of public debt, high distortionary taxes, and government overspending, lead to
lower levels of output and investment and impair the long run welfare in the economy. The
main political frictions analyzed by the theoretical studies are the lack of commitment by
the government to the long-term scal plan and political uncertainty or political turnover.
The evidence suggests that both of these frictions are present to some extent in the modern
economies. Indeed, the government budget plan is updated on annual basis and the
composition of the government changes over time. The lack of government commitment
induces the party in power to re-optimize on its scal policy every time period and leads
to distortionary taxation of inelastic assets (i.e., interest rate on public debt or tax on
physical capital). Uncertainty about the prospects of reelection reduces the e¤ective
discount factor of the government, making the party in power short-sighted relative to
the households and leading to overborrowing and overspending by the public sector. The
main potential causes of political turnover rent-seeking activities by the politicians and
political polarization in the society further reinforce production distortions.
The aim of this work is to quantify these theoretical ndings by looking at the data.
We ask how much of the variation in public debt, government spending, and taxes can be
explained by the presence of political frictions in a sample of developed countries. This
question is important both from economic and from the policy perspective. If the political
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frictions account for a signicant fraction of variation in scal variables, it may be more
e¢ cient to reform the political system in the worst performing countries rather than to
impose restrictions on spending or borrowing on their scal authorities, as has been done
recently in the European Union. We consider developed countries which allows us to
concentrate on the role of political frictions alone and at the steady state, abstracting
from various other institutional and economic frictions that characterize economies in
transition.
Following the related studies, our analysis is based on the Lucas and Stokeys (1983)
type economic model with a lack of commitment by the government. We consider di¤er-
entiable Markov perfect equilibrium government policy, assuming that the reputational
mechanisms are not operative. We discuss two political frictions: political uncertainty (to
which we also refer to as political turnover) and non-alignment of government and citizen
preferences. The former friction implies that the governments are short-sighted; the latter
friction implies that the government does not maximize the utility of the representative
households. We discuss two interpretations of this second political friction. First, there
may be disagreement in the society about the composition of public good, with the party
in power providing only the public good which is preferred by its electorate. In such case
the political friction we refer to is political polarization (Alesina and Tabellini, 1990, Azz-
imonti, 2011). Second, the government can have preferences for rent-seeking and divert a
part of public spending. In such case the political friction is public rent-seeking (Yared,
2010). In the considered framework, one parameter captures political uncertainty and
another parameter can be interpreted as capturing either political polarization or public
rent-seeking.
We nd that political turnover or political polarization/public rent-seeking alone can-
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not explain the pattern of public debt and government spending in developed countries.
This is caused by the properties of the model at the stable steady state. Without political
turnover, public debt is zero at the steady state, regardless of the magnitude of the other
political friction. Without political polarization/rent-seeking, an increase in public debt
due to a reduction in e¤ective discount factor of the government caused by political uncer-
tainty leads to an increase in private consumption and a decrease in public consumption.
In the data, correlation of public debt and government spending is positive. Combining
political turnover with political polarization/rent-seeking allows to replicate public debt
- public spending relationship by varying two parameters governing political frictions.
The data on political frictions is based on surveys and rely on perceptions. Therefore,
some caution should be taken when interpreting the results. We use several indicators
of political frictions in the data and rely on the regression estimates to summarize the
common features of the data in the measures of political frictions in the model. In this
way we avoid possible shortcomings of using any particular indicator. In addition, the
calibration strategy we use allows to achieve the best possible performance of the model
in generating scal variables directly a¤ected by political frictions, given empirical data
on these frictions.
For calibration, we rst estimate the country-specic frictions which are required by
the model to replicate the public debt and government spending, averaged over the period
1995-2012, in each of the twenty two developed economies considered in this paper. Then,
we regress these model-generated political frictions on their counterparts in the data.
Finally, we use the predicted values from the regression to map the political frictions data
into the model and check the model predictions about the scal variables.
We nd that the model with political frictions explains 67% of variation in public debt
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levels, 36% of variation in public spending, and 24% of variation in income taxes in twenty
two developed countries. The calibration strategy based on the combination of the best t
model estimates and empirical data suggest that the political economy model of optimal
scal policy is able to account for a signicant fraction of pattern in scal variables.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briey reviews some of the related litera-
ture. Section 3 describes the scal policy model featuring the lack of commitment by the
government, political uncertainty, and another political friction, which can be interpreted
either as political polarization or as political rent-seeking. Section 4 discusses the prop-
erties of the model. Section 5 compares the predictions of the model to the data in a
sample of twenty two developed countries. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
This paper aims at evaluating the predictions of the political economy models about the
consequences of political frictions for scal policy in developed economies. To that end,
we formulate a dynamic political economy model which collects several key features from
the models with political frictions studied in the literature. These features are: political
turnover or political uncertainty, public rent-seeking or political polarization, and the lack
of government commitment (thus, we consider the scal policy in a time-consistent setup).
Persson and Svensson (1989) and Alesina and Tabellini (1990) were among the rst to
show theoretically that political turnover in the presence of political polarization leads to
higher public debt levels in a time-consistent setup. In their work, as well as in the works
of their followers, political polarization is dened as disagreement in the society about
the desired composition of public goods. Thus, political turnover is a consequence of
di¤erence in preferences of the society and not of politician misconduct. Azzimonti (2011)
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endogenized political turnover in a neoclassical growth model with political polarization
via a voting model in which the outcome of the election is dictated by political preference
shock as well as voters expectations about the economic outcomes. She showed that
both political turnover and political polarization impair investment rates and economic
growth rates, at the same time leading to excess government spending. In this paper, we
evaluate the role of political turnover and political polarization in public policy dened
as government decisions about public debt, public spending, and income taxes.
If there is no disagreement in the society about the public policy, political turnover
can be an instrument to discipline the politician for misbehavior such as rent-seeking
activities or pork-barrel spending. Battaglini and Coate (2008) built a political economy
model with legislature who can distribute revenues back to their districts through pork-
barrel spending. Their theory predicts that public debt and taxes are higher than those
in the economy without political frictions. Caballero and Yared (2010) characterize the
equilibrium transition path of an economy managed by a sequence of politicians who
face political risk and who care about both household welfare and private rents. They
nd that the rent-seeking government overborrows and under-taxes along the equilibrium
path relative to a benevolent government if political risk is high relative to economic
uncertainty and over-saves and over-taxes if economic volatility is su¢ ciently high relative
to political uncertainty. Yared (2010) studies optimal taxes and debt management in
a stochastic economy in the presence of rent-seeking politicians which can be removed
from o¢ ce for misbehavior. He nds that taxes are volatile and persistent with rent-
seeking government, di¤erently from the benevolent government case, and rise in debt is
e¢ cient in the sense that it precludes excessive rent-seeking. Acemoglu et al. (2008a,
2008b, 2011a, 2011b), similarly to Yared (2010), show that the need to provide incentives
6
to politician in power creates political economy distortions. They demonstrate that if
politicians are characterized by lower patience level than the citizens, the best subgame
perfect equilibrium is characterized by positive long-run capital taxation. In the setup we
consider in this paper, we are able to evaluate the role of public rent-seeking combined
with political uncertainty in determination of public debt, spending, and taxes. We nd
that public rent-seeking data performs better that political polarization data in accounting
for variation in public variables.
Political distortions depend on another important characteristic of public policy, which
accords with the presence of political turnover: the lack of commitment by the govern-
ment to its scal plan. As a consequence of the absence of commitment, the government
reoptimizes on its policy every period. The scal outcomes under no commitment can be
di¤erent from those that would occur under the full commitment by the government even
in the absence of any political frictions (see, for example, Klein et al., 2008; Debortoli
and Nunes, 2013). On the other hand, as shown by Debortoli and Nunes (2010), political
frictions can lead to ine¢ ciencies even if the government is completely benevolent and
commits to its scal plan while in power. We consider a time-consistent setup in which
the government reoptimizes on its scal plan every period. It has been shown that the
interactions between the government and the households in the case of absence of govern-
ment commitment can give rise to multiple equilibria supported by trigger strategies and
reputation mechanisms. The literature takes di¤erent stands on which solution method
to apply and which set of equilibria to characterize. A number of studies characterize the
entire set of Pareto-e¢ cient allocations subject to incentive constraints faced by politi-
cians. Another approach is to restrict a set of equilibria to those that are dened only
by payo¤-relevant states, that is, to consider Markov-perfect equilibria. We follow the
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second approach and consider di¤erentiable Markov equilibrium.
A number of studies have discussed the consequences of political frictions for economic
uctuations. For example, Ales et al. (2014) demonstrate how economic and political
cycles can be jointly determined and production distortions result if policymakers are non-
benevolent, cannot commit to policies, and have private information about the government
budget and rents. Azzimonti (2014) obtains economic uctuations due to asymmetries
in reelection probabilities across parties that compete for the o¢ ce. Aguiar et al. (2009)
and Aguiar and Amador (2011) show how political frictions lead to economic distortions
in small open economy. In this paper, we consider the long-run consequences of political
frictions. Therefore, we analyze economic outcomes in developed countries and use the
predictions of the model at the steady state.
3 Description of Economic Environment
Consider an innite-horizon economy populated by agents of measure 1, a half of which
live in region N, and a half on which live in region S of the country. Agents work in the
production sector for a competitive wage and enjoy the consumption of private goods,
ct, public goods, gJt , and leisure, xt. Agent preferences over public good may be region-
specic (in such case, J 2{N,S}; more on this below). Every period, the agents have time
endowment of 1, purchase one-period public bonds from the government, bt+1, at price pt,
pay taxes on their income,  t; and receive income from previous period public bonds, bt.
Their budget constraint in period t is given by:
ct + ptbt+1 = (1   t)wt(1  xt) + bt: (1)





t ), where U; the instan-
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taneous utility function, is increasing and concave in each of its arguments, subject to
their budget constraints and given government policy, and  is the discount factor. The
resource constraint in this economy is given by:
Ct +Gt = A(1 Xt) = yt; (2)
where Ct is aggregate consumption, Gt is total public spending, 1 Xt denotes total labor,
yt is the total output, and A is the technology parameter.
3.1 Government Policy
There are two political parties that compete for the o¢ ce. The incumbent party cannot
follow a long-term scal plan due to the lack of commitment technology. Moreover, with
probability p the incumbent party will stay in the power in the following period, and with
probability 1   p it will be replaced by its political opponent. Under such conditions,
the party in power plays a game against the opposition taking their policy as given. To
characterize government policy, we adopt the notion of Markov-perfect equilibrium, where
policy functions depend only on fundamentals.
Every period, the party in power decides on the issues of public bonds and the levels of
taxes to nance public spending and to repay previous period public debt (previous debt
obligations are always honored because default is very costly) to maximize its objective.
The incumbent makes decisions about its policy taking into account anticipated next
period policies of itself, if re-elected, or its opponent, if not re-elected. We assume that
p is exogenous. Azzimonti (2011) provides microfoundations for the determinants of p;
in her work, under particular assumptions, endogenously determined p is independent of
economic state variables in equilibrium.
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Consider the following instantaneous utility function of the incumbent party:
u(ct; xt) + v(g
J
t ); (3)
where u and v are increasing and concave in their arguments,  2 [0; 1] and v(0) = v.
We refer to two interpretations of this utility function.
First, following Azzimonti (2011, 2014), we can assume that gJt is indexed by region,
J2{N,S}, and (3) coincides with the instantaneous utility function of the agents from
region J; U(ct; xt; gJt ) = u(ct; xt) + v(g
J
t ). In this case, there is disagreement in the
population over the desired composition of public expenditures and the party in power
provides only its region-specic public good. The parameter  denes the importance
of public good in overall utility of the agent and measures the degree of polarization in
the country (the higher ; the more important the utility derived from the public good
relative to the utility from the private consumption and leisure and, because agents enjoy
utility only from their region-specic public good, the higher political polarization in
the country). Under such interpretation, political turnover is a natural consequence of
preference heterogeneity in the society.
Second, we can assume that the rst term in (3) coincides with the instantaneous
utility of the households while the second term represents utility derived from the private
rent of politicians in power, so that U(ct; xt; gJt ) = u(ct; xt). The parameter  measures
the degree of public rent-seeking (the higher ; the more weight is put by the politicians in
power on rent-seeking activities relative to the maximization of welfare of the electorate).
In this case, the public policy of both parties is the same and the political turnover
is dened by political preferences unrelated to economic outcomes (for example, moral,
ethnic, or religious).
Under both interpretations, the party out of power enjoys instantaneous utility u(ct; xt)+
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v. Given that the agent utility function (3) is either separable in public consumption
(under rst interpretation), or independent of public consumption (under second inter-
pretation), and given that both regions are taxed at the same rate, agent decisions about
private consumption, labor supply, and purchases of public bonds are independent of their
region of residence. Therefore, Ct = 1=2ct + 1=2ct = ct, Xt = xt, Gt = gJt . The agents
consumption, work, and saving decisions are determined by (1) and the following two
optimality conditions:
ux(ct; xt)=uc(ct; xt) = (1   t)wt; (4)
ptuc(ct; xt) = uc(ct+1; xt+1): (5)
We use primal approach and express the problem of the government in terms of choos-
ing household allocations and savings that implement optimal scal policy. In particular,
we combine (1), (4), and (5) into one implementability constraint by substituting away
taxes and prices. We can express public spending from the resource constraint as follows:
G(ct; xt) = A(1  xt)  ct; (6)
The government maximizes its value function subject to the optimality conditions of
the households (4), (5), and the resource constraint (6), given anticipated future policies.
It announces its policy, t = fct; xt; bt+1g, at the beginning of each period, after being
elected or reelected and after observing the level of inherited debt, bt. Given the sequence
of events and the separability between the economic and political dimensions, the only
payo¤-relevant state variable for the government is the level of inherited debt. Denote
anticipated future policy as (bt+1) = fC(bt+1);X(bt+1);B(bt+1)g.
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The problem of the party in power takes the form:
max
c;x;b0





0);X(b0))b0   ux(1  x)  ucb = 0; (8)
where prime denotes next period, V (b0) is the value function of the party in power, and
W (b0) is the value function of the party out of power.
Government policy in equilibrium is dened as follows.
A Markov-perfect equilibrium is a set of policy functions fC(b);X(b);B(b)g and value
functions V (b) and W (b); such that
i) fC(b); X(b); B(b)g = argmaxc;x;b0 u(c; x) + v(G(c; x)) + pV (b0) + (1  p)W (b0)
subject to (6) and (8); and
ii) V (b) = u(C(b);X(b)) + v(G(C(b);X(b))) + pV (B(b)) + (1  p)W (B(b));
W (b) = u(C(b);X(b)) + v + pV (B(b)) + (1  p)W (B(b)).
We assume the policy functions followed by future governments are di¤erentiable and
concentrate on the symmetric policies by the parties in power.
Denote the implementability constraint (8) as (c; x; b; b0) and let  be the Lagrange
multiplier associated with this constraint. The optimality conditions associated with the
government problem consist of (6), (8), and the following equations:
uc   vg   c = 0; (9)
ux   Avg   x = 0; (10)
0u0c + (1  p)v0g(C0b + AX0b)  b0 = 0; (11)
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where the last equation contains the derivatives of the value function with respect to the
state variable (simplied using the optimality conditions (9)-(10)):
Vb = uc;
Wb = uc + vg(Cb + AXb);
forwarded one period.
Equations (9) and (10) dene the private-public consumption and consumption-leisure
wedges caused by distortionary taxes. Equation (11) species the optimal choice of public
debt to balance the current and next-period wedges taking into account the e¤ects of
future policy on public debt accumulation. The term (1 p)v0g(C0b+AX0b) captures the
additional cost of political polarization/public rent-seeking. It reects the e¤ect of current
government policy on future public spending if the current incumbent is not reelected.
4 Discussion
The general consensus in theoretical literature is that political uncertainty reduces the
discount factor of the government compared to the households, leading to positive debt
and higher taxes in equilibrium while political polarization or political rent-seeking lead
to overspending by the government.
In this section we analyze whether these properties hold in the version of the economy
described in the previous section. The system of equations (6), (8), (9)-(11), which
describes the optimal solution to the government problem, is highly non-linear and does
not have analytical solution in general. First, we consider a particular example of utility
function that allows closed-form solution to form an idea about the relationship among
the variables in the model. Then, we discuss the properties of the model in a more general
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case with the help of numerical analysis.
4.1 An Example of Economy with Analytical Solution
Consider the utility function of the party in power which is linear in leisure and public
spending with weights 1 and  > 1, respectively; assume that the utility is logarithmic in
consumption (3) with weight a, 0 < a < (  1)=; v = 0; and normalize A to 1.1
We obtain the following characterization of this economy at the steady state:
At the steady state of the economy characterized by u(ct; xt) = a ln ct+xt and v(gt) =
gt; with  > 1, 0 < a < (   1)=, private consumption and leisure are increasing in
public debt, public consumption is decreasing in public debt, public debt is zero if there is
no political turnover ( p = 1) and positive if there is political turnover ( p < 1); higher
weight on public consumption, , leads to higher public spending, lower public debt and
private consumption, and higher taxes.
Proof: The optimality conditions (8), (9)-(11) with the instantaneous utility consid-
ered in the example simplify as follows:
a+ a=c0b0   1 + x  ab=c = 0; (12)
a=c    ab=c2 = 0; (13)
1     = 0; (14)
(1  p)=(1  )(C0b +X0b) + a=c20c0bb0 = 0: (15)
Equation (13) is quadratic in consumption and can be solved for consumption as a function
of public debt. The following root features positive consumption: C(b) = a(1+(1+4( 
1This example has been considered by Debortoli and Nunes (2013) in the economy without political
turnover.
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1)b=a)0:5)=(2); from where Cb > 0. From (12), Xb = a=c20C0bb
0B0b   a=c0bB0b + a=c  
ab=c2Cb; which, evaluated at the stable steady state is equal to (1 B0b)a=c(1 b=cCb) >
0, because 0 < b=cCb < 1:
Then, from the resource constraint (1), Gb < 0. Increasing the weight on public
spending increases g; thus b; x, and c decrease. From the optimality condition of the
household problem, taxes are negatively related to private consumption, so they increase
when private consumption decrease.
Finally, from (15) evaluated at the steady state and given that Xb and Cb are positive
for any b, b = 0 if p = 1 and b > 0 if 0 < p < 1.k
Numerical analysis suggests that the properties of the variables in the particular exam-
ple considered in this subsection also hold for more general utility functions, as discussed
below.
4.2 A More General Case
We refer to numerical analysis to characterize the impact of political frictions on scal
policy and on economic outcomes for more general utility functions. Description of the




1   + 
g1 
1   ; v = 0: (16)
Figure 1 shows the steady state public debt, government spending, taxes, and private
consumption as functions of political turnover (p) and political polarization or public
rent-seeking (). We use the following parameters to construct the plots:  = 0:98;
a = 0:5;  = 1;  = 1; A = 10 (changing any of the parameter values within the
reasonable range does not change the qualitative behavior of variables depicted on Figure
15
1).

















































































The impact of political instability, p: Similar to the conclusions of the related
studies, we obtain that public debt increases with political instability. In uncertain
prospects of reelection, the party in power is short-sighted relative to its electorate and
therefore is a net borrower in equilibrium. If there is no political uncertainty, public debt
is zero at the (stable) steady state. Private consumption is an increasing function of pub-
lic debt, so it also increases with political turnover. At the steady state, the households
can enjoy higher consumption from interest income on their savings. On the other hand,
public consumption is a decreasing function of public debt. Thus, contrary to the con-
clusions of some of the studies that nd that higher political uncertainty leads to public
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overspending, we obtain that government consumption is lower when political turnover is
larger.
From the optimality conditions of the household problem, the tax rate set by the
government is proportional to the marginal utility of private consumption. Therefore, the
income tax (and, in this economy, the tax revenues as a share of GDP) decreases with
political instability. The government shifts from tax to debt-nanced spending.
The total output is lower when political instability is higher. Similar to private con-
sumption, leisure is an increasing function of public debt, thus, it increases with political
turnover.
The impact of political polarization and/or political rent-seeking, : Sim-
ilar to the conclusions of the related studies, we obtain that public spending increases
with political polarization (or rent-seeking). This is a straight-forward consequence of
polarization/rent-seeking being modelled as a value of marginal utility from government
spending. Higher public spending is nanced through income taxes which also increase
with polarization.
At the same time, given the level of political uncertainty, higher polarization or pref-
erence for rent-seeking activities reduce equilibrium public debt level. This is a feature
of the model economy: government consumption crowds out savings by the households
in equilibrium, leading to lower levels of public debt and private consumption. The labor
supply increases (it is a decreasing function of public debt) and therefore the total output
also increases with the degree of polarization (rent-seeking).
At a rst glance, these predictions of the model regarding the role of political polar-
ization (or political rent-seeking) seem controversial. Except for reducing private con-
sumption, this political friction leads to higher output and lower public debt, and both
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are usually considered as an improvement of economic conditions.
However, political polarization or political rent-seeking are usually among the main
causes of political turnover. If there is no disagreement in the society about the composi-
tion of public goods and if the government in power is completely benevolent, there would
be no reason to throw the politicians out of power. It is therefore the interplay between
political polarization and political turnover what denes the nal impact of these political
frictions on scal variables and economic outcomes.
In Table 1 we summarize the signs of the correlation coe¢ cients among the scal,
economic, and political variables in the model, keeping one of the two political frictions
xed, and in the data.2
Table 1: The sign of the correlation coe¢ cients between political variables and economic
outcomes in the model and in the data.
p  y b=y g=y  c=y x
y +/- +/- 1 -/- +/- +/+ -/- -/+
b=y -/- -/+ 1 -/+ -/- +/+ +/-
g=y +/+ +/- 1 +/+ -/- -/+
 +/+ +/- 1 -/- -/+
c=y -/- -/+ 1 +/-
x -/+ -/- 1
Notation: each row of the table contains the sign of the correlation coe¢ cient in the model and the sign
of the respective correlation coe¢ cient in the data, separated by "/".
Both in the model and in the data, government spending and taxes increase with
political stability, are positively correlated among themselves and negatively correlated
2The data sources and more detailed analysis of the data are provided in the next section.
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with private consumption; government debt and private consumption as shares of GDP
decrease with political stability, are negatively correlated among themselves and with
taxes; output is positively correlated with taxes and negatively correlated with public
debt and consumption shares. The signs are opposite in the model and in the data for
correlations of the measure  and of x with all of the variables. The signs of the correlations
between public spending and output or public debt are also opposite to those in the data.
Thus, the model captures some of the qualitative features of the data, but no all of them.
In order to evaluate the model performance in capturing the quantitative features, we
should account for the existence of relationship between p and , which are correlated in
the data. In the next section, we analyze the political and economic data in more detail,
and use the model to characterize the joint inuence of political uncertainty and political
polarization/rent-seeking on economies in a sample of developed countries.
5 Reconciling Theory and Data
The aim of this section is to analyze whether a stylized model of optimal scal policy with
political frictions outlined in this paper is able to account for the pattern of relationship
among the scal variables in developed countries. First, we discuss the properties of the
data on political and economic variables in a sample of twenty two developed countries.
Second, we use the model to map the data on government spending and government debt
into the estimates of political frictions. Third, we evaluate the relationship of the model-
generated political frictions with their counterparts in the data. Finally, we project the
data on political frictions from the data into the model to calculate the scal and economic
variables in the model and compare the results with characteristics of the data.
The data on political frictions is limited to indicators based on surveys and has been
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criticized for a number of possible shortcomings. The main criticism is that the measures
of political frictions rely on perceptions, and therefore, can depend on the economic per-
formance of the country being evaluated. Other points of criticism include reliance on
the opinions of a small group of people in constructing the data and narrowness of the
existing measures. To reduce the consequences of data limitations, we consider several
indicators of political frictions and we rely on the average correlation coe¢ cients between
the political and economic variables. We use the data from the Quality of Government
Dataset (Teorell et al., 2015) except for the measures of political polarization which are
taken from Lindqvist and Ostling (2010). Table 2 summarizes the measures of political
frictions which we consider in this study and the correlation coe¢ cients among them.3
Some of these measures are more related to political turnover (p), others to public rent-
seeking or political polarization () or their inverse (1=). Note that although the variables
come from di¤erent original sources and reect slightly di¤erent dimensions of political
frictions, the correlation coe¢ cients are very similar across di¤erent variables and always
of the same sign. In particular, the indicators corresponding to p and  are negatively
correlated, those corresponding to p and 1= are positively correlated, and di¤erent in-
dicators of p are positively correlated among themselves, as well as di¤erent indicators
corresponding to  or 1=.
We use the following economic indicators: central government debt, government con-
sumption, and private consumption shares of gross domestic product (GDP); real GDP,
taxes on income and prots, and labor hours. All data is averaged over the time period
1995-2012. The levels of real GDP in every country in the sample are normalized by the
level of real GDP in the USA, average over 1995-2012. The labor hours (equivalent of
3More detailed description of these variables can be found in Teorell et al. (2015).
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Table 2: The correlation coe¢ cients for the data on political frictions.
Variable p1 p2 p3 p4 p5 p6 p7 p8 p9
p1. Political Stability Estimate (p) 1
p2. Freedom House/Imputed Polity (p) 0.4 1
p3. World Institutional Quality () -0.7 -0.7 1
p4. Corruption Perceptions Est. ( 1) 0.7 0.7 -1 1
p5. Corruption Perceptions Max ( 1) 0.7 0.7 -1 1 1
p6. ICRG Indicator of Gov. Quality ( 1) 0.7 0.7 -1 -1 1 1
p7. Functioning of Government ( 1) 0.5 0.8 -0.9 -0.9 0.9 -0.8 1
p8. Independence of the Judiciary ( 1) 0.4 0.7 -0.8 -0.8 0.8 -0.7 0.8 1
p9. Political Polarization Equality ( 1) -0.2 -0.4 0.3 0.3 -0.3 0.4 -0.2 -0.1 1
p10. Political Polarization Private ( 1) -0.3 -0.3 0.5 0.5 -0.4 0.5 -0.3 -0.1 0.3
Data Sources: Teorell et al., (2015), Lindqvist and Ostling (2010).
1 x in the model) are average hours actually worked normalized by 12*365. The data is
from the Quality of Government Dataset (Teorell et al., 2015). The list of the countries
and the data are presented in Table 5 in the appendix.
Comparison of the data across countries suggest that countries characterized by higher
output per capita and lower consumption per capita are also characterized by higher
political stability, lower public rent-seeking and lower public debt levels (though, there is
no clear relationship between output and political polarization measures). For example,
Luxembourg has the highest level of GDP in the sample and the highest level of political
stability combined with the lowest level of public rent-seeking and public debt. Greece is
the last but one in the ranking by the level of GDP per capita and has the highest level
of public debt; at the same time, it is the most politically unstable and has the highest
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public rent-seeking, according to the Transparency International corruption perceptions
index. Table 3 reports the correlation coe¢ cients among economic and political variables
in the sample of twenty two countries considered in this study. For political variables, the
reported correlations are the mean values of the correlation coe¢ cients between each of
the political variables listed in Table 2 and respective economic variable.
Table 3: The correlation coe¢ cients between political variables and economic outcomes
in the data.
p  y b=y g=y  c=y x
p 1
 -0.6 1
y 0.4 -0.3 1
b=y -0.6 0.6 -0.6 1
g=y 0.1 -0.3 -0.2 0.2 1
 0.3 -0.4 0.1 -0.2 0.4 1
c=y -0.4 0.5 -0.7 0.5 -0.3 -0.4 1
x 0.4 -0.4 0.3 -0.5 0.4 0.2 -0.6 1
The model analyzed in this paper has public debt as the only state variable and
features Cb > 0, Gb < 0, Xb > 0 (as discussed in the previous section); all the resources
are allocated either to private or to public consumption, so that corr(c; g) =  1. In
the data, both public and private consumption are positively correlated with public debt
share of GDP (the correlation coe¢ cients are 0.2 and 0.5, respectively), while leisure is
negatively correlated with public indebtedness (the correlation coe¢ cient is -0.5). By
varying only one parameter of political frictions, either p or , the model generates public
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debt perfectly negatively correlated with public consumption and taxes and perfectly
positively correlated with private consumption and leisure. Thus, the model-generated
public debt or taxes and public spending move in the opposite direction to that of their
data counterparts in the case of varying only  or only p, respectively. Moreover, in the
data, the political frictions are correlated (the average correlation coe¢ cient between the
variables associated with p and  is -0.6).
Therefore, as noted earlier, we should consider the interplay of political turnover and
political polarization/rent-seeking in conceptualizing the relationship among the political,
scal and macroeconomic indicators. To that end, we proceed with the calibration of the
model in the attempt to quantitatively account for the e¤ect of the political frictions on
public outcomes in the data.
For calibration, we x the discount factor and the utility parameters for all countries
and assign them the following values:  = 0:98; a = 0:5;  = 1;  = 1. There are
many ways the data on political frictions can be mapped into the measures of political
frictions in the model, p and ; the success of the model depends on the chosen mapping.
Moreover, there are many variables which can be interpreted as either p or  (see Table
2). Therefore, we use a mapping which combines a number of political indicators in the
data to generate p and  in the model and which potentially helps the model to better
replicate the scal outcomes. We proceed as follows.
First, we estimate the country-specic values of p, , and A in the model, which
match the public debt levels, government spending, and GDP, in each of the countries
in the sample. We refer to this estimation as "Model (0)" and summarize the results
in column "Model (0)" of Table 4. The rst ten rows of the data of Table 4 are the
correlation coe¢ cients between the variables generated by the model and the correlation
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coe¢ cients between the respective variables in the data. The last ve rows of the data are
the correlation coe¢ cients between the variables generated by the model and the data.
The model does replicate the correlation between public debt and spending and predicts
correctly the sign of the correlations among a number of other variables of interest (i.e., the
correlation of government spending with the remaining economic variables; the correlation
between private consumption and taxes, private consumption and leisure, leisure and
taxes). However, the correlations between public debt and taxes, consumption, or leisure
are opposite to those in the data. This is caused by the properties of the model discussed
in the previous section. In the model, the factors which increase public debt (such as
political turnover) also increase consumption and leisure, and this ensures stability of the
steady state (see Debortoli and Nunes, 2013). Model (0) perfectly replicates public debt
and spending by construction, and explains about 10% of variation in taxes and private
consumption in the considered sample of countries.
To understand the strong and weak sides of the model in replicating the data, we plot
the scal variables and several indicators of political frictions in the data, along with the
measures of political frictions generated by Model (0), with all variables sorted by the
public debt levels in the considered sample of countries. The results are presented on
Figure 2.
From the plots it is easy to see that the public debt levels and most of the measures
of political frictions in the data follow similar patterns. Moving from the least indebted
country to the most indebted country, public debt increases steadily at a relatively low rate
with a sharp rise in debt levels for the most indebted countries (the top left plot on Figure
2). For that reason, these highly indebted developed countries are frequently considered
as outliers. Most of the measures of political frictions listed in Table 2 follow the pattern
24




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The data and notation: p(1) - Political Stability Estimate; p(2) - Freedom House/Imputed Polity; p(3) -
World Institutional Quality; p(4) - Corruption Perceptions Estimate; p(5) - Corruption Perceptions
Max; p(6) - ICRG Indicator of Gov. Quality; p(7) - Functioning of Government; p(8) - Independence of
the Judiciary; p Model(0) - political stability generated by Model (0); rho Model (0) - political
polarization/rent-seeking generated by Model (0). Data Source: Teorell et al., (2015).
similar to that of public debt levels: very low (or absent) levels of frictions for the least
indebted countries with a sharp rise for the highly indebted countries (the top right plot
and the second and third row plots on Figure 2). Thus, political frictions potentially have
25
high explanatory power in explaining public debt levels. On the contrary, the pattern of
public spending and taxes does not show any particular dependence on political frictions.
The measures of political polarization do not exhibit any signicant correlation with any
scal variable, and therefore are not shown on the graph. The political frictions generated
by the Model (0), presented by the bottom plots on Figure 2, follow similar pattern to
the political indicators in the data (except for the measure of political stability (p1) and
the measures of political polarization (p9) and (p10)).
Second, we calibrate the model to evaluate its performance in explaining scal and
economic variables given the measures of political frictions in the data. Table 2 suggests
that di¤erent indicators of political frictions can potentially be used as an input accounting
for political frictions in the model. Instead of relying on one particular indicator, we
combine information contained in di¤erent indicators by regressing them on p and  from
Model (0). We use the predicted values obtained from the estimated regression to map the
data on political frictions into the political frictions in the model and check the predictions
of the model about the remaining variables. We refer to this model as Model (1).
The regressions we estimate and the coe¢ cients with standard errors in parenthesis


















p5; R2 = 0:84: (18)
We assess the model by comparing the correlation coe¢ cients generated by the model
with those in the data. Column "Model (1)" of Table 4 presents the results.
The signs of the correlation coe¢ cients between the variables from the model and from
the data are the same as those generated by Model (0). The model explains 67% (0.822)
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Table 4: Calibration results.
Correlation Model (0) Model (1) Model (2) Data
(b=y; g=y) 0.20 0.61 0.32 0.20
(b=y; ) 0.33 0.72 0.48 -0.28
(b=y; c=y) -0.20 -0.61 -0.32 0.54
(b=y; x) 0.99 1.00 1.00 -0.48
(g=y; ) 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.43
(g=y; c=y) -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -0.33
(g=y; x) 0.29 0.64 0.38 0.37
( ; c=y) -0.99 -0.99 -0.98 -0.43
( ; x) 0.41 0.76 0.53 0.22
(c=y; x) -0.29 -0.64 -0.38 -0.63
(bm=y; bd=y) 1.00 0.82 0.82
(gm=y; gd=y) 1.00 0.38 0.60
(m;  d) 0.37 -0.01 0.49
(cm=y; cm=y) 0.33 -0.39 0.11
(xm; xd) -0.43 -0.38 -0.39
Notation: b=y - central government debt as a share of GDP; g=y - public consumption as a share of
GDP; c=y - private consumption as a share of GDP; y - real GDP per capita;  - taxes; x - leisure
hours. (V m; V d) - denotes the correlation between variable V in the model and in the data.
of variation in public debt levels and 14% (0.382) of variation in public spending, but fails
to explain any fraction of taxes or consumption.
The plots on Figure 2 suggests that the sample of considered countries consists of two
groups: relatively low indebted countries with low political frictions and highly indebted
countries characterized by high political frictions. To account for this heterogeneity we
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repeat the estimations as in Model (1) but including an indicator of political frictions to























(p5)2; R2 = 0:93; (20)
and corresponding correlation coe¢ cients are presented in column "Model (2)" of
Table 4.
The signs of the correlation coe¢ cients are the same as those generated by Model (0)
and Model (1). In addition, Model (2) explains 67% of variation in public debt levels,
36% of variation in public spending, and 24% of variation in income taxes.
The model outlined in this paper captures the essence of the relationship between scal
variables and political frictions. However, the correspondence between the scal policy
and economic outcomes in the model does not comply with the data. One important
variable through which public policy a¤ects economic variables and which is missing from
the model is capital formation. Political frictions can distort investment (Azzimonti,
2011), which in turn has consequences for private consumption and leisure. However,
in many attempts to solve the economy model with both physical capital and public
debt we did not succeed in nding stationary solutions to the model; related discussion
on the problems of such models can be found in Ortigueira et al. (2012). Moreover,
there may be other factors inuencing scal variables in developed countries, such as,
for example, the interest rate (which in the model is xed at 1= for all the countries),
nancial markets, openness to trade, or prolonged economic shocks. The message of
the calibration performed in this paper is that political frictions alone can account for
a signicant fraction of variation in the public debt levels, conrming political economy
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theories of public debt determination.
We should note that the results of calibration discussed in this section are robust to
changes in the parameters ; a, , ; and hold for di¤erent forms of the utility function
u(c; x) (e.g., the utility function separable in consumption and leisure and GHH utility
function).
6 Conclusions
In this paper we analyzed the performance of the optimal scal policy model with political
frictions. We compared the correlations among the scal, macroeconomic, and political
variables generated by the model with those in the data from a sample of twenty two
developed countries. We conclude that the model predicts the relationship between scal
variables and political frictions consistent with the correlations among these variables in
the data. The model accounts for 67% of variation in government debt, 36% of variation
in government spending, and 24% of variation in taxes, given the measures of political
frictions in the data.
The analysis in this paper suggests several directions for further research. First, in-
corporation of physical capital accumulation in the type of model economy discussed in
this paper could improve the performance of the model in replicating macroeconomic
variables. It could break the direct interconnection between public debt and private and
public consumption, characterizing the model discussed in this paper, by allowing the
households to save both in physical and nancial assets. Second, additional investigation
on the determinants of political polarization, public rent-seeking, and their connection
with political uncertainty could give more insights on the main political drivers of scal
distortions. Finally, extending the model to include other frictions, such as imperfect
29
nancial markets and default risk, or exogenous economic shocks, could help to clarify
the importance of political frictions in comparison to other major factors a¤ecting public
policy and economic performance in developed countries.
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To solve the system of equations (6), (8), (9)-(11), the unknown policy functions are











where n = 3 and Hi(b) denotes the Hermite polynomial of order i, and aY;i denotes the
coe¢ cient of the policy function Y associated with the Hermite polynomial of order i.
Given the functional forms in (21), the solution to the original system with  substituted
away, consists of nding 3n unknown coe¢ cients
fac;i; ax;i; ab;igni=1: (22)
The system of equations (8), (9)-(11), with government spending dened by (6) and 
substituted away by combining (9) and (10), contains only three equations; the additional
equations can be obtained by di¤erentiating the original system with respect to the state
of the economy, b. The rst and second di¤erentials of each of the three original equations,
together with the original equations, all evaluated at the steady state, can be solved for
the unknown coe¢ cients (22).
As a by-product of this numerical algorithm, the stability of the system (8), (6), (9)-
(11) at the steady state can be analyzed: if the rst derivative of the policy function
B(b) has an absolute value of less than 1, corresponding steady state of the system is
asymptotically stable. The results reported in the main text are associated with the
stable steady state of the model.
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Table 5: The Data.
Country/Variable y b=y g=y  c=y 1  x p 
Australia 0.796 0.263 0.176 0.166 0.569 0.397 0.984 0.135
Austria 0.832 0.671 0.190 0.124 0.548 0.407 1.150 0.221
Belgium 0.788 0.998 0.226 0.164 0.528 0.358 0.884 0.314
Canada 0.824 0.580 0.203 0.158 0.554 0.399 1.006 0.123
Denmark 0.824 0.494 0.265 0.295 0.489 0.357 1.147 0.052
Finland 0.755 0.549 0.226 0.171 0.520 0.393 1.491 0.058
France 0.721 0.720 0.237 0.099 0.569 0.346 0.565 0.307
Germany 0.765 0.434 0.191 0.107 0.579 0.331 0.922 0.209
Greece 0.581 1.240 0.177 0.077 0.716 0.473 0.344 0.566
Iceland 0.816 0.717 0.242 0.153 0.564 0.411 1.341 0.099
Ireland 0.893 0.545 0.169 0.119 0.483 0.383 1.194 0.235
Italy 0.704 1.180 0.193 0.140 0.593 0.417 0.587 0.544
Luxembourg 1.680 0.093 0.162 0.138 0.378 0.375 1.409 0.159
Netherlands 0.863 0.580 0.246 0.104 0.484 0.322 1.109 0.120
New Zealand 0.622 0.473 0.183 0.198 0.596 0.411 1.240 0.060
Norway 1.132 0.335 0.209 0.187 0.444 0.328 1.293 0.127
Portugal 0.520 0.742 0.195 0.085 0.646 0.408 1.006 0.367
Spain 0.662 0.499 0.185 0.099 0.585 0.389 -0.032 0.367
Sweden 0.813 0.582 0.266 0.182 0.485 0.371 1.251 0.080
Switzerland 0.961 0.317 0.113 0.126 0.595 0.378 1.303 0.120
United Kingdom 0.765 0.563 0.202 0.134 0.646 0.385 0.486 0.174
United States 1.000 0.662 0.152 0.122 0.669 0.413 0.442 0.253
Data Source: Teorell et al. (2015). 34
